Lucie Kalousová: Testing of the endowment effect: does the endowment effect depend on market experience?

Supervisor: Ing. Helena Chytilová

Abstract: The main purpose of this thesis is to analyze the dependence of the endowment effect on market experience of an individual. This dependence is examined on three age groups – children from second-grade, children from sixth-grade and undergraduate students – through field experiment (children) and laboratory experiment (undergraduate students). Total of 147 subjects were tested. Subjects under test were offered the opportunity to exchange goods they received into their possession at the beginning of the experiment, for another predetermined goods. The data were analyzed by contingency tables. Endowment effect was observed in the (market inexperienced) children of both ages, while undergraduate students (who are assumed to have gained more market experience) didn’t demonstrate this effect. Dependence between endowment effect and market experience was found at the 5% significance level.

BA thesis can be found here (in Czech only).

Samuel Škoda: Effort and cheating behavior: An experiment

Supervisor: PhDr. Michal Bauer, Ph.D.

Abstract: In this work I study the relationship between cheating and required effort by means of an economic experiment. First, participants engage in a real-effort task and then are their payoffs randomly determined. However the experimental design allows them to misreport their payoffs. This method aims to establish whether higher effort required leads to increased dishonesty. I find that that the average self-reported payoff is not significantly higher when the required effort is higher. Apart from the main results I find that cheating is more frequent among students with economics major and among students with previous exposure to economic experiments.

BA thesis can be found here

Ivo Strejček: Are Economists More "Selfish" Than Non-Economists?

Supervisor: Doc. Ing. Zdeněk Chytil

Abstract: I study the problem of altruism in social behavior. I test the hypothesis that students of economics behave less altruistically and show lower level of social cooperation than their peers in non-economic majors. I use four experiments mainly based on Dictator Game with groups of both econ and non-econ students. Results cannot support hypothesis of lesser altruistic behavior of students with economic majors. Data show that in one-round games both groups fared more or less equally. However, there is a possibility that different types of altruism exist between treated groups: economists may tend to more rational altruism waging future profits (reciprocal altruism); non-economists may consider more social pressure, strong reciprocity and act under influence of instant emotional state.

BA thesis can be found here (in Czech only).

Tomáš Marek: Is Jiří Dvořák More Employable than Demeter Lakatoš?

Supervisor: Ing. Petr Houdek

Abstract: Thesis presents experimental evidence for statistical discrimination on Czech labour market. The first research is based on sending false curriculums vitae with both typically Romany and typically Czech names. It has been written to 256 work announcements and more than 60 % answers were received. The discrimination of Romany people has been proved in more than a half of the cases. The second research, in the form of a questionnaire, was targeted on employers and people who offer jobs. More than 95 % of respondents think that Romany nationality plays an important role for an applicant. Almost two thirds are convinced of discrimination on the Czech labour market and 11% confessed themselves to discrimination. Research also elaborates the causes of the discrimination. The respondents see the reasons in insufficient education of Romany people, their lack of persistence when looking for a job and statistical discrimination of Romany minority.

BA thesis can be found here (in Czech only).

Marek Pekoč: Are Women More Altruistic Than Men?

Supervisor: Doc. Ing. Zdeněk Chytil

Abstract: There are many papers using dictator game framework, but only few of them focus on exploring the differences between women´s and men´s behaviour in this game. The hypothesis we test is that men are more selfish than women. To do that we conducted two versions of the dictator game experiment. In the first treatment subjects were asked to divide money between themselves and well known humanitarian organization after presentation by a organization representative. In the second modification a different group of subjects divided between themselves evaluation points of a particular university course in two rounds and in between these rounds a histogram of the aggregate results of the first round was disclosed to all participants. Experimental results indicate that men behave less altruistic than women in some situations. Men redistributed by 22.7 % less money to the account of the humanitarian organization than women. On the other hand, there was no difference in behavior between two sexes in the first round of the second treatment. In the second round, however, the behaviour of the two genders was significantly differentiated as women were giving by 14, % more points for the benefit of „opponent“, as a result of information provided in the first round about aggregate behaviour of the subjects.

BA thesis can be found here (in Czech only).

Helena Chytilová: Money Illusion and Economic Education, an Experimental Approach

Abstract: Money illusion as a "lost" concept from history of economic thought regained its significance recently. Fehr and Tyran (2000) found some evidence about its impact supporting predictions of the New Keynesian model. Coordination problem magnified by money illusion helps monetary shocks to deviate the economy from equilibrium for a long time or even to harbour it in an inferior equilibrium if several equilibria exist. We test experimental groups which differ by economic education achieved. Pay-outs depend on subjects ability to choose an optimal price which is shaded by the veil of nominal values. This project investigates whether economic education weakens or even suppresses effects of money illusion (or the other way around at worst). If the hypothesis tested is proved to be true, it may be that educated professional economists contribute to reduction of money illusion in the economy directly by setting prices for indivuidual companies or indirectly as consultants or advisors. At the aggregate level it may bring lesser level of efficiency caused by changes in monetary policy due to speedier convergence of the economy to a new equilibrium, or by lower probability of staying in an inferior one.

Pavel Zechmeister: Testing of UE ETS Trading Models, BA thesis, Faculty of Economics and Public Administration, UEP 2011

Supervisor: Ing. Marek Mičúch

Abstract: We ran three different experiments to simulate three trading periods of the EU ETS scheme that all posses different features. The fact, that two trading periods are already almost history, gives us a chance to compare results of experiments with naturaly occuring data. Price development in first two experiments were almost identical to those that occured in real markets. It gives us confidence regarding data behavior within the third trading period. We predict that the implementation of primary auction of EUAs will not have any significant impact on pricee of EUAs (ceteris paribus) - at least in the short run.

BA thesis can be found here (in Czech only). 

Experimental verification of bounded rationality in various institutional environments, supported by IGS 2011 

Project Supervisor: Petr Koblovský

Abstract of the project: Cooperation being one of the methods to increase the utility of involved parties is, from the economic theory perspective, indisputable. Many research papers however show that the reason for human cooperation can not stem only from the pure analysis of expected utility as people cooperate also in scenarios outside the Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, descriptively more precise research analyses on strong reciprocity would usually ignore different institutional rules which can be altered by the subjects' true preferences. Consequently, experimentally generated formulas and patterns of human behavior are strictly design specific to particular games and their overall usability in predicting behavior of subjects in different institutional settings are limited. The project's aim is to research on the above mentioned issue by introducing an unique type of economic games. Moreover, we will attempt to show, that by extending of  the models it is possible to explain some behavior deriving from taking into account generally known social norms and explain the phenomenon of paternalism as a maladaptive strong reciprocity. The models can help us find out, whether the inclination to paternalism is a result of altruistic pursuits for achieving optimal social outcome or a result of arrogance of regulators and errors of regulatory designs in which the regulators operate without being insentivised to cut costs or enhance the outcome of the regulated and being self involved in enhancing their own interests. More information here.

Experiments within the project:

Ludmila Hadincová: Endowment Effect: Do We Appreciate More Information from Books?, BA thesis, Faculty of Economics and Public Administration, UEP 2011

Supervisor: Mgr. Petr Houdek

Abstract: The main purpose of this thesis is to answer a question, whether an individual appreciates more information originating from physical media than information from virtual media. Respectively, if these two types of media have a different impact on the endowment effect. This effect is conditioned by the individual’s physical possession of an object that is provided by physical media, but not allowed by virtual media. The first part of the experiment is based on the comparison of buyer ’s willingness to pay for information from physical and virtual media (WTP) with seller’s willingness to accept payment for the information (WTA). The results from the first part of the experiment did not satisfy the hypothesis about participant’s higher valuation of information from physical media. But it was found out that buyers were more willing to pay for the information from physical media suggesting the emergence of quasi-endowment effect. Subjects were reluctant to pay for the electronic version of information. The second part of the experiment is based on comparison of participant’s preferences for books in regular and virtual format. It was proved that participants who had an experience only with the book in electronic format were more eager to exchange it for the other book. The opposite effect was documented for participants who had the book in regular format. So, the results from the second part of the experiment provided weak evidence on behalf of the prediction about greater impact of physical media information on the endowment effect. The thesis is further focused on detection of personal characteristic’s impacts on the endowment effect. Finally, it was discovered that subjects felt loss aversion of information and that information from books was perceived trustworthier.

BA thesis can be found here.

Experimental projects receiving the support from GAUK (The Charles University Grant Agency) for years 2011-2012

Lubomír CinglDependence of creation of information cascades on decision time  

Project number: 4046/11

Supervisor: PhDr. Michal Bauer, PhD

Abstract: In my previous experiment on topic of creation of information cascades in Cingl (2010), relationship between level of time pressure and the probability to herd was ambigous and therefore I want to intensify the research in this field. I want to replicate the original experiment on the creation of information cascades as in Anderson and Holt (1997) and only add to the design the time constraint. The experimental treatments will have (apart from the control group with unlimited time) a binding time constraint ranging from “too much" time to “very little" time to make a decision. Generally the Anderson and Holt (1997) experiment was already replicated many times in many different ways, but there has never been focus on the time dimension in this way, so the proposed experiment will contribute to the innovative research in this field. External conditions for conducting the experiment are excellent as there is a new laboratory of experimental economics at University of Economics and the equipment for measuring heart-rate is now in the inventory of Charles University. The results will provide basis for the next experiment that will deal with herd behavior during panic in the financial markets in the second year of the grant. 

Ian Levely: Trust and Trustworthiness Among Ex-Combatants in Northern Uganda: Experimental Evidence

Project number: 3494/11

Supervisor: PhDr. Michal Bauer, PhD

Abstract: The project aims to collect unique data from experimental games conducted with ex-combatants in Northern Uganda. The goal of the experiments is to determine the degree of trust and trustworthiness among and between two groups of individuals: those who have previously been abducted to serve in the Lord’s Resistance Army and those who have not. The results of this experiment will explain to what extent discrimination and trustworthiness play a role in poor labour market outcomes observed among former combatants. This issue is relevant to post-conflict economic development as it helps to explain an observed outcome among ex-combatants in Northern Uganda and elsewhere. Additionally, the project represents a unique use of experimental economic methodology, as experimental games have not yet been used to measure this particular outcome.

Dagmara Katreniaková: Information, aspirations and incentives to learn: A randomized field experiment in Uganda

Project number: 3389/11

Supervisor: PhDr. Michal Bauer, PhD

Abstract: Will be added soon. Be patient with us. 

Olexander Nikolaychuk: tba

Project number: 3408/11

Supervisor: Mgr. Peter Katuščák, PhD.

Abstract: The majority of experimental papers on learning in games under incomplete information seem to be preoccupied with either documenting empirical regularities or running horseraces among the existing theoretical models. It is my firm belief, however, that explaining differences across games and where those are coming from is of no less importance. This research project is geared towards understanding the very basics of the learning process by focusing on one of its main characteristic features – i.e. the speed, with which human subjects learn.
From the individual perspective, learning can be thought of as going through two principle feedback channels: (i) how much one’s payoff is affected by his or her own actions; and (ii) how much one’s payoff is affected by his or her opponent’s actions. I propose a novel approach that represents these two learning channels in the form of primitive games with plausible economic interpretations and allows classic games to be viewed as mixtures of the two. Such decomposition is shown by the example of Prisoner’s Dilemma and is hypothesized to provide the foundations for a general framework that could allow for sensible comparisons across all existing games.

Advanced Methods in Experimental Economics - Selected Abstracts, Summer Semester 2011

Laboratory experiments (in alphabetical order according to authors)

Jakub Caisl: Public Goods Punishment Experiment with Limited Information;Abstract: In this study, we elaborate on design of the public goods games with punishment, based on Gächter and Fehr seminal paper on this topic. The feature that we try to alter is the completeness of information provided about other subjects decisions. We provide only limited information instead about how much other people contributed. We analyze how does it change the punishment patterns. Then we try to compare results of group versus individual punishment schemes under the limited information setting. The problems we are especially concerned about is the threshold nature of the decisions taken by subjects, the coordination in punishment and different feelings associated with punishing groups or individuals.

Luboš Dostál: The Effects of Other-Regarding Preferences in Bribery Games: An Experimental Approach; Abstract: Will be added soon. Be patient with us.

Klára Kalíšková: The Role of Other-Regarding Preferences in the Provision of Public Goods by Fixed-Prize Lotteries; Abstract: There is an extensive theoretical and experimental research on designing mechanisms that overcome underprovision of pure public goods under the voluntary contributions mechanism (VCM). We build upon one particular line of research, starting with Cornes and Sandler (1984, 1994) and Andreoni (1990), which proposes bundling public goods together with private goods as a way of overcoming the free-rider problem. In particular, we consider an environment first proposed by Morgan (2000) in which the private good component consists of a lottery (raffle) ticket that gives the owner a chance to win a prize financed by a portion of collected contributions, while the probability of winning the prize is equal to the share of individual’s contributions in the total sum of all contributions. We explore the extent to which lottery financing of public goods interacts with other-regarding preferences for giving. In particular, we want to see to what extent the subjectspecific difference of giving in the two fund-raising mechanisms (lottery vs. VCM) can be explained by such preferences. Experimental design includes elicitation of other-regarding and risk preferences of subjects, four stages of public goods games with different lottery prizes (including zero prize which corresponds to the VCM), and one stage with endogenous choice of lottery prize (each subjects chooses his or her most preferred lottery prize and participates in a public good game with this chosen lottery prize). The main hypothesis is that introduction of individual financial incentives (positive lottery prizes) crowds out the other-regarding motives for contribution to the public goods. Therefore, we test whether the rate of increase of the average contribution with increasing lottery prize is decreasing with other-regarding motives of subjects. Results of will shed new light on the usefulness and revenue-generating capacity of fixed-prize lotteries as opposed to the VCM for financing of public goods and charities. In particular, it will help us to understand to what extent such fundraising choice depends on the social preference profile of the target contributor population.

Tomáš MiklánekThe Power of Shame: The Effect of Ex-post Disclosure in the Ultimatum and Dictator Games with Uncertainty; Abstract: The behavior of people in ultimatum games with full information was explained by many models of other-regarding preferences. If uncertainty about the cake size is added, the results are shifted towards more selfish outcome from the proposer’s point of view .This paper tries to develop a model which extends altruistic behavior into the environment with information asymmetry. The model is based on importance of the fact that other subject is aware of our action. The resulting level of shame from our action is derived from the level of other subject’s information completeness. The paper contains experimental design to test predictions of this model. Also the results from the pilot session with some preliminary conclusions are provided at the end of the paper.

Iryna Momotenko: Controlling People's Perceptions of Corruption: Experimental Approach; Abstract: Despite the significant amount of anti-corruption programmes proposed by policymakers and international organizations corruption is one of the most serious obstacles to economic and social development in many countries around the world. One of the possible reasons why this phenomenon is so persistent is disagreement about determinants of corruption and how they can possibly be influenced. The objective of this paper is to show that corrupted behavior of people depends on their perceptions about the level of corruption in a society. In order to demonstrate this, a laboratory experiment was conducted in which individuals’ perception of corruption was manipulated by giving different information upon level of corruption in a group, and, hence, their willingness to behave corruptively. The results obtained suggest that individuals’ corrupted behavior does depend on the information they get. Thus, by influencing people’s beliefs about the level of corruption one may control the real level of corruption in a country.

Ján Palguta: Fairness in Contract Design: Endogenous Selection of Agents into Implicit Contracts; Abstract: Fehr, Klein and Schmidt (Econometrica, 2007) experimentally show that fairness concerns may have a decisive impact on the actual and optimal choice of contracts in moral hazard context. We propose a straightforward extension of their experiment, in which the decision about the contract type is not purely in the principal’s hands, but in which also the agents can select themselves into different types of contracts. We argue that the rule of the game regarding which side proposes the contract type may have a crucial impact on the measurement of the fairness of agents. We generalize the contract proposing procedure and on a limited dataset from a pilot experiment we observe that sorting seems to promote trust and reciprocity between the pairs of players, which leads to an improved efficiency in the selected contracts.

Marek Rusnák: Coordination in the Minimum Effort Games: The Role of Intergroup Competition; Abstract:  We explore channels which the exposition to competition enhances the cooperation through. Specifically, we want to distinguish between the psychological effect of being exposed to competition and the effect of a change in payoffs. Therefore, four treatments are implemented. In the first treatment, the subjects play simple minimum effort game. In the second treatment, information about the levels of minimum effort in the other group is provided to all subjects. In the third treatment, there is no comparison effect, but subjects are given extra payoff if the minimum effort is higher then some predetermined threshold. In the fourth treatment, there is a bonus if the minimum effort level of the group is higher than its competing group. Results of pilot experiments here.

Arshad Hayat Yousafzai: Does Information About Gender  and Subject Major of the Responder Affect the Decision of the Proposer in the Trust Game?; Abstract: Results from trust game to analyze the effect of information about the gender of the responder on the decision of the proposers are reported. The proposers trusted relatively higher on female as compared to male responders and female responders were offered on average 21.80 CZK/round more than the male responders. Moreover the proposers showed willingness to pay on average 3 CZK/round for information about the gender of the matched responder as compared to the average actual price of 5.45 CZK/round. 

Field experiments (in alphabetical order according to authors)

Vojtěch Bartoš: Implicit Discrimination in the Czech Labor Market; Abstract: An experiment aims to measure the effect of three different approaches to racial and ethnic discrimination – taste-based, statistical and implicit discrimination. Subjects recruited among Czech and Vietnamese students from Prague (the capital of the Czech Republic) high schools would be conducting a real-life task that would allow for exact productivity measure. After the first round of the task in which subjects work individually, randomly selected subjects would be invited to the second round. For this round, they would be asked to select a partner from an experimentally manipulated list containing, among other, names either of members of their own group, or of a different group. It will be manipulated in two dimensions. First, it would either provide the information about the productivity of possible partners or not. Second, the decision process would either be framed in a way that requires rational thinking (System II) or in away that relies rather on an instantaneous reaction (System I). The decision task would be our measure of discrimination, allowing for testing all three proposed approaches to discrimination.

Jana Cahlíková: Economic and Political Integration: Can It Work?; Abstract: Experimental Evidence from Public Goods Games Institutions, both formal and informal, significantly influence economic outcomes. Determined at least partially by history, formal and informal institutions tend to differ across societies, as confirmed by previous research. In the second half of 20th century, the process of European Integration has begun and also many countries, mainly in Africa and Middle-East, were created artificially. A question is whether such integration – in terms of applying common formal institutions to societies with different informal rules – can work and whether it is sustainable. Recent problems faced by the European Union, such as lack of fiscal discipline by some countries and inability to agree on a future form of the EU, seem to confirm these concerns, and so does the political development in Africa and Middle-East. In this research, I am trying to access by experimental means whether economic and political integration of societies with different social norms can work. The experiment to be run is a public goods game without and with a punishment opportunity of the design used by Fehr & Gachter (2002), and modified by Herrmann et al. (2008). Many public policies, such as paying taxes, voting, or applying environmental measures have to deal with the free rider problem. Wherever a potential for free-riding exists, successful cooperation among unrelated individuals is crucial for obtaining socially-optimal outcomes; public goods games are a standard tool for studying this cooperation. The research will compare public goods provision in the situation when just subjects from the same country are asked to cooperate with treatments in which subjects from countries with different social norms are integrated. Different degrees of integration will be studied - integrating students from two countries in a 1:1 versus 3:1 ratio and integrating only two countries versus integrating several countries. Furthermore, this research project would like to determine whether a particular choice of formal institutions (availability of specific punishment mechanisms) can improve cooperation under integration. The punishment mechanisms analyzed represent three different situations: a situation in which each country can try to improve cooperation by punishing only within its own borders, a situation in which each country can punish both within and across its borders, and a situation in which only the high-performing country (in terms of cooperation) can punish.

Miroslava Federičová: Single sex versus coeducational schools: Deepening of gender stereotype threat?; Abstract: Will be added soon. Be patient with us.

Branislav Zudel: Psychology and savings: evidence from a field experiment; Abstract: will be added soon. Be patient with us.

Natalia Shestakova: Understanding Consumer Choice of Pricing Schemes

Supervisor: Mgr. Peter Katuščák, PhD.

Abstract: Consumer life is full of choices. Often, consumers face the problem of choosing a multi-part pricing scheme. Examples include tariffs for utilities and telecom services, credit card contracts, saving and insurance plans, and many others, up to packages of different size in supermarkets. This paper investigates whether consumers make such choices optimally, what factors explain potential deviations from optimality, and how the efficiency of the choices can be improved. 

The project was a part of the PhD thesis defended on December 8, 2011. The whole text of it can be found here.

Olexandr Nikolaychuk: Individual Learning under Assymetric Information and Limited Environment Feedback

Abstract: There are various real-life scenarios that can be characterized by their participants having asymmetric knowledge of the underlying nature of the interaction they are actually involved in. In case the environment feedback is limited, either due to some physical constraints or because of strategic considerations, the situation may turn out to be even more gruesome. That is why it is surprising to see that the existing economic literature has concentrated on symmetric, both complete and incomplete, information settings, paying limited attention to explicitly studying asymmetric ones. This project uses game theoretical and experimental techniques to research dynamic interactive social environments with knowledge asymmetry among the agents about the underlying payoff structure and limited environment feedback in the form of repeated games. It focuses on the effect of such information conditions in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Stag Hunt, and Battle of Sexes games, as the ones traditionally utilized by economists. The expected results should provide both theoretical and empirical estimates of a player wise measure of the “value of information” in generic repeated social interaction scenarios.

Lasha Lanchava: On the Existence of the Utility Premium for Being Free or the Rational Irrationality

Supervisor: Mgr. Peter Katuščák, PhD.

Abstract: Several studies in various fields of economic research demonstrated somewhat peculiar results that cannot be explained by conventional economic theory. These studies show that if individuals are denied the possibility to commit certain actions either by law, penalty or by any other enforcement mechanism, they are not deterred and in contrast more people violate the law. The authors of these studies propose various speculations, nevertheless, none of them sounds credible. The theory of psychological reactance (Brehm 1966), well known in social psychology, seems to explain all these peculiarities in a very simple manner as it predicts that once the freedom of individuals is threatened, then a form of psychological emotional state arises, which induces people to act to secure their self-determination. However, if it is not understand in the context of rationality the theory cannot explain why people behave irrationally, when they are prohibited doing so. In this paper I would like to document experimentally that people derive utility from having free choice. Moreover, I would like to show that if anything prevents people to act as they will, then they will be happy to act irrationally if this action preserves their freedom. Taking to the extreme, and some studies show that it is indeed the case, if you prohibit people to die they will commit suicide. On the contrary, if one restrains people to be nice, they will become brilliant.

PhD thesis proposal can be found here.

Ludmila Svatošová: Analysis of behaviour and decisions of participants in Dutch and English auctions with uniform price and homogenous products, BA thesis, Faculty of Economics and Public Administration, UEP 2010

Supervisor: Ing. Marek Hudík

Abstract: The thesis deals with the behavior and decision making of players in the English auction with homogeneous goods. To analyze the behavior and decision making, a laboratory experiment was conducted. The experiment used three types of environments, each of them characterized by a different probability distribution of values. The fundamental question that this work tries to answer is whether the frequency of the optimal price varies according to auction environment and whether, in all the environments the choice of optimal strategy prevails. Analysis proceeds as follows: first in each auction round the optimal prices was determined and then it was compared to the price actually achieved. Based on this analysis it was found that the frequency of optimal price choices does not differ significantly among tested environments. However, the optimal price was achieved only in very few rounds of the auction.

BA thesis can be found here (in Czech only).

Luboš Cingl: Do information cascades arise easier under time pressure? Experimental approach, MA thesis, IES FSV UK 2010

Supervisor: PhDr. Michal Bauer, PhD

Abstract: Information cascades as a form of rational herding help to explain real-life phenomena such as fads, fashion, creation of 'bubbles' in financial markets or conformity in general. In this thesis I model both the propensity to herd as well as the propensity to view public information that may lead to herding. I carry out a laboratory experiment where I let subjects perform a simple task under different treatment conditions with the possibility to herd. Researchers normally imposed the uncertainty about the private signal by providing a task probabilistic in its nature such as drawing balls of different color from an urn and the decision-making was sequential. I conduct an experiment where the order of decision-making is endogenous and a task that is not probabilistic, but I impose uncertainty of private signal by increasing time pressure. This is expected to make participants prone to imitate the behavior of others, even though the others will be exposed to the same conditions. The time-pressure is also expected to induce stress reaction, which I measure as a physiological proxy variable – the heart rate frequency. Participants after each task state the subjective level of stress they felt to be in. I compare these two indices of stress if they bring same results. I also account for personality differences by measuring them in the “Big Five” dimensions by a battery of standardized questions. If significant, the personality traits may provide another piece of evidence that the original informational approach to herding is not exclusive and personality is also an important underlying factor. Apart from that I examine the effect of reputation (also called endorsement effect) as an addition to the public pool of information, which is expected to increase the probability to herd. 

MA thesis can be found zde.

Vojtěch Bartoš: Discrimination, Information and Cognitive Effects: Evidence from a Field Experiment in the Czech Rental Housing Market, MA thesis, IES FSV UK 2010

Supervisor: PhDr. Michal Bauer, PhD

Abstract: Aim of this thesis is to shed light on discriminative behaviour of landlords in the Czech rental housing market using our data from a double blind Internet field experiment. The experimental design allows us to study the processes of choice of the landlords deciding about inviting or not inviting a particular member of a minority group to a visit of the offered flat. We control for various characteristics that may influence the resulting outcome and we try to disentangle their effects. Mainly we control for the minority group effect, for the effect of education and several congitive factors that, according to a rich socio-psychological and behavioral-economical literature, affect the decision-making. We introduce an innovative toll that allows us to study landlord's behaviour using a special online mouse tracking program based on widely used MouseLab. The thesis is a part of a comprehensive research studying discrimination of minorities and the role of information in the Czech rental housing market.

BA thesis can be found here.

Jakub  Caisl: How Matching Grants and Their Size Affect Behaviour and Where, BA thesis, IES FSV UK 2010

Supervisor: PhDr. Michal Bauer, PhD

Abstract: In this work we focus on a large scale randomized field experiment described in Karlan & List (2007). Using direct mail solicitations to more than 50000 prior donors of a large U.S. non-profit organization, they examine the effects of matching grants on behaviour. They describe the effects of the matching grants in general, for the whole population, and find that matching grant size has no impact on behaviour. We use a different approach, dividing the population into subgroups by income and education and then measuring the effects of matching grant size on donating behaviour in these subgroups. We find significant heterogenity in the effects of grant size on behaviour. Also we try to apply the theory of social identity when interpreting the effects of matching grants.

BA thesis can be found here.